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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. : Case No. 14330 
WILLIE FOLKES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is the reply brief of the appellant in his appeal from a con-
viction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
for value, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(ii) (1953), in the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of guilt entered against 
him and a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OFFICER WHO SEIZED THE AMBER COLORED 
BOTTLE HAD "NO" KNOWLEDGE OF ITS CONTENTS 
BEFORE ITS SEIZURE 
Appellant submits that the respondent has been less than candid in 
its recitation of the facts surrounding the seizure of amber colored bottle. With 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the exception of the final three pages of its brief, respondent predicates each 
of its arguments on an inaccurate depiction of the factual circumstances under-
lying the seizure of the amber colored bottle by Officer Niemann from the 
appellant's bedroom. Each argument urged by the respondent conveys the 
deceptive impression that Officer Niemann, the policeman who seized the amber 
colored bottle, as well as his partner, Officer Bell, both observed the appellant 
obtain capsules apparently containing heroin from the bottle, when in fact the 
clear import of Officer Niemann's testimony both at the suppression hearing and 
at the trial was that he had never seen the bottle nor did he know what the bottle 
contained when he seized it. In attempting to marshall the facts to support its 
legal arguments, respondent makes statements which indiscriminantly use the 
pronoun "they" or the noun "police", rather than more precisely referring to 
that which each respective police officer could or could not see. For example, 
in Point II of respondent's brief the argument is asserted that the seizure was 
legally accomplished as a search incident to an arrest , or in the alternative, 
because the bottle was in plain view. In making these arguments, respondent 
states, "The police observed appellant return the small amber colored bottle 
to the bedroom. " (Respondent's brief at 11; Emphasis Supplied). And later in 
the argument, the following dangerously imprecise language appears without 
any attempt to accurately describe who saw what in relation to who did the 
seizing, "They saw where the appellant kept the bottle. Therefore, after the 
arrest they simply picked up the bottle as evidence . . . The officer knew what 
was in the bedroom and merely picked it up as evidence." (Respondent's brief 
at 11; Emphasis Supplied). 
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The testimony at both the suppression hearing and at trial fail 
to support any justification for the above quoted language which unmistakably 
leads one to believe that Officer Niemann knew what was in the bottle when he 
seized it. Because of the crucial importance of this factual matter to the 
resolution of the legal issues raised in this appeal, a number of quotations 
from the transcript will follow for the purpose of demonstrating that as far as 
Officer Niemann knew, he did not have the knowledge which respondent imputes 
to him when he seized the bottle. On cross-examination by defense counsel, 
Officer Niemann testified (R. 89, 90): 
Q. Now, did you see the defendant set a bottle on the table, 
an amber bottle? 
A. No. As I have stated before, of my own volition, or of 
my own knowledge, I never saw that bottle. 
Q. And you had a plain view of the defendant? 
A. Yes. While he was seated at the table. 
Q. While he was seated at the table, did you at any time see 
an amber bottle sitting on that table? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever see him shake caps out of the amber bottle? 
A . I never saw any caps coming out of a bottle. All I saw 
was him handing them to the persons in the room. 
And later during cross-examination, Officer Niemann testified further that he 
did not remember Officer Bell ever telling him about the bottle (R. 96, 97): 
Q. You don't remember whether Officer Bell ever mentioned 
that bottle to you? 
A. No, I really don't remember. Digitized by the Howar  W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. How about when you were sitting out on the ledge? Did 
he mention it at all then? 
A, No. I think probably he assumed I had seen it. 
Q. Now, when you were sitting on that ledge, you didn't have 
much discussion at all, did you? 
a. Very little. What talking we did do was in a very, very 
low whisper, and most of it was conducted with hand 
* signals, almost sign language. 
Q. Very few words? 
A. Very little. 
Q. So any words that were said, you would recall them, 
wouldn't you? 
A. Probably. 
Q. And you don't recall him mentioning the bottle? 
A. No, I really don't remember him saying anything about it. 
Thus, not only did the seizing officer never observe the bottle before the moment 
that he seized it, but furthermore, he did not remember ever being told about 
its existence or its contents by Officer Bell who had seen it and who did know 
what it apparently contained. 
After misrepresenting this factual circumstance throughout its entire 
brief, respondent does point out at the conclusion of its brief that the seizing 
officer, to the best of his recollection, could not recall having any knowledge of 
the bottle whatsoever when he picked it up. Respondent seeks to impute the 
knowledge of Officer Bell to Officer Niemann on the tenuous ground that Officer 
Bell recalled mouthing the words to his partner while the two were crouched on 
the ledge prior to their entry into the apartment. Although it may be true that 
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Officer Bell attempted to communicate this information to his partner, it 
is readily apparent that he failed in this endeavor since, Officer Niemann, the 
seizing officer, did not recall any such communication. As asserted in 
appellant's brief throughout Point III and particularly at pages 23 and 34, in 
order for the seizure of the amber colored bottle to comply with the mandate 
of the Fourth Amendment, Officer Niemann would have had to have known that 
it contained contraband or its incriminating nature would have had to have been 
immediately apparent. If Officer Niemann cannot recall knowing what the bottle 
contained when he picked it up, Officer Bell - the knowing officer - certainly 
cannot testify in his behalf. Appellant submits that since Officer Niemann never 
understood the attempted communication by Officer Bell, it follows that the 
seizure of the bottle by Officer Niemann was unreasonable as that term is 
used in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
One, Section Fourteen of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and hence, 
evidence seized pursuant to that search should have been suppressed at appellant's 
trial. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S ARREST OCCURRED IN THE KITCHEN 
In response to Point II in appellant's brief (at page 13), respondent 
argues, contrary to the testimony of the arresting officer, that the appellant 
was arrested in the bedroom, and not in the kitchen. Respondent argues that 
an arrest occurs at the point when the arrestee 's freedom of movement has been 
so restricted that he knows that he is no longer free to leave. Although this may 
be the law in the jurisdictions cited by respondent, that is not the status of the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
law on arrest in Utah. In Utah, in addition to the physical act of restraining 
the arrestee 's freedom of movement there must also be a concurrence of an 
intent to arrest by the arresting officer. The Supreme Court of Utah articulated 
this rule in State v. Beckendorf, 79 U. 360, 10 P. 2d 1073 ( 1932 ). In this case, 
the defendant was charged with unlawfully resisting an arrest . The point at 
which an arrest occurs was therefore the ultimate issue to be resolved on appeal. 
The uncontradicted evidence at trial was that three police officers went to the 
home of the defendant to execute a search warrant for liquor. Upon gaining 
entry to the defendant's home, the officers found the defendant and her son in 
the bathroom in the act of destroying the liquor. At that point the defendant 
offered stubborn resistance to prevent the officers from obtaining possession 
of the liquor. One of the officers then took the defendant by the wrist and led 
her into the kitchen. Once in the kitchen, the defendant managed to free herself 
from the officer and leave the house. The Court held that under these circum-
stances, restraining the defendant without a corresponding intention to arrest 
her on the part of the officer did not constitute an arrest : 
We are of the opinion that an arrest cannot be made 
without the presence of an intention on the part of the 
arresting officer to make the arrest . The primary 
requisite in making an arrest must be the intention 
on the part of the arresting officer to make an arrest . 
(10 P. 2d at 1076). 
In the instant case, it is clear that Officer Niemann, the officer who 
placed the appellant under arrest , did not have the requisite intent to effect an 
arrest until the appellant had moved into the kitchen. At the suppression hearing, 
Officer Niemann testified as follows (R. 6): 
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Q. Did you say you stepped into the bedroom? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Then did you arrest the defendant there, or did you take 
him to another room and arrest him? 
A, After Mr, Folkes opened the window and I came in, I 
had to crawl across the bed which was immediately 
adjacent to the window, and while I was crawling 
across the bed, he had moved -- it?s a very small 
room, and he had moved back through the doorway 
into the kitchen, and I believe it was in the kitchen 
where he was arrested. 
Officer Niemann's testimony on direct examination at the trial was to the 
same effect (R. 83): 
A [I] turned around and told Willie not to move, 
we were police officers. I did have my gun drawn. We 
entered the room across Willie's bed, and he at this 
point had stepped back into the room towards the kitchen. 
We entered. The arrests were made, and we got ready 
to take them to jail. 
It follows therefore that since the arrest was made in the kitchen, the amber 
colored bottle sitting on top of the dresser in the bedroom was well beyond the 
area of the appellant's "immediate control", as that term was defined in Chimel 
v. California, 359 U. S. 752(1969): 
There is no comparable justification, however for routinely 
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs 
. . . . Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized 
exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search 
warrant. The "adherence to the judicial processes" man-
dated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less. (395 U. S. 
at 763). l 
Even assuming arguendo that the arrest did occur in the bedroom, appellant 
1. See appellant's brief at 16. 
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submits that a search and seizure of a bottle from the bedroom subsequent 
to the removal of the appellant to the kitchen where his hands were handcuffed 
behind his back (R. 6, 94, 99) exceeded the Chimel zone of MlungeabilityTT. 
Indeed, it strains credulity to think that such a search remote both in time 
and place from the point of arrest could qualify as a search limited to the area 
within the arrestee 's immediate control. Appellant submits that the cases 
cited by respondent contravene not only the spirit of the Chimel decision, but 
2 
the very essence of it. The flaw in those decisions and in respondent's 
argument in the instant matter is that they disregard the qualification placed 
on a Chimel search that it must be Mstrictly tied to and justified by the cir-
cumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. M (395 U.S. at 762). 
In a situation where the appellant is removed from the area searched the 
justification underlying a Chimel search - to prevent the arrestee from obtaining 
a weapon or destructible evidence - is no longer present. Furthermore, the 
element of time is an important factor in ascertaining whether a search is 
justified as being incidental to a warrantless arrest . Where the search is 
conducted some time after the arrestee has been arrested and secured, the 
justification for dispensing with the warrant requirement has disappeared. 
The search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant requirement should not 
be expanded to insulate a general exploratory search unsupported by probable 
cause like that conducted in the instant case. 
2. See appellant's brief at 15. 
i 
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CONCLUSION 
Because Officer Niemann did not know what the amber colored 
bottle contained when he seized it, and because there was no probable cause 
to believe that it contained contraband, weapons or evidence of a crime, its 
seizure by the officer violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
3 
Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Constitution of Utah. 
Furthermore, the search of the bedroom and seizure of the bottle cannot qualify 
as a search incident to a lawful arrest because the intrusion into the bedroom 
exceeded the scope of the search as circumscribed by Chimel v. California. 
Even if we assume that the arrest was constructively made in the bedroom, the 
argument urged by the respondent would easily lend itself to abuse and emascu-
lation of the Chimel "area within the immediate control of the arrestee. M 
For the reasons stated above and the arguments previously asserted 
in appellant's original brief, it is requested that the judgment of the trial court 
be reversed and the appellant granted a new trial. 
DATED this <?f~ day of r^m^ 1977. 
5 
Respectfully submitted, 
fN 
IJACK W. KUNKLER 
Attorney for Appellant 
^•KoMcf V^)A^(UcC) 
RONALD J. YENGICH / ' / 
Attorney for Appellant '-J 
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